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Introduction 
In 2013 the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) began negotiating the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Although tariff lines average 3-4%, 
the rates for certain categories and individual products are much higher,
1
 so removing or 
reducing tariffs in a €700bn annual bilateral trade relationship translates into large savings for 
the companies involved (especially small and medium sized enterprises), and ultimately  
lower consumer prices.
2
 Yet TTIP is primarily about reducing or eliminating ‘behind the 
border’ restrictions to trade and investments, so-called technical barriers to trade (TBS), 
focusing in particular on attaining various degrees of regulatory convergence, while in the 
process setting dominant international standards.
3
 
The costs of complying with differences in regulatory and technical product standards 
across the Atlantic vary by sector and product line, but estimates range from the equivalent of 
adding 10-20% tariffs up to 73%.
4
 Neither transatlantic partner assesses the effects of 
proposals on transatlantic trade or business activities. The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) assesses the impact of major US legislation; the Commission 
assesses most new EU legislation.
5
 The EU requests public feedback on a proposed law 
(directive or regulation), and third parties can submit proposals, but no comment period 
applies when it comes time to write the rules for the same law; the opposite applies in the US. 
A Regulatory Impact Coordination Council (or similar) in TTIP, serving as a liaison between 
regulators, would also be useful in TTIP. There are only a few vague guidelines for OIRA and 
the Commission references to assess the impact of regulations on trade; one study found that a 
Transatlantic Regulatory Impact Assessment on product safety regulations applied on both 
sides of the Atlantic would improve real American and European income by .05-.1 percent by 
cutting compliance costs for business.
6
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There are general commitments to cooperate on removing additional regulatory 
barriers, increase transparency, enhance mutual understanding of respective systems, and 
align regulations with international standards, while respecting both sides’ laws. There are 
many ways to remove horizontal and vertical differences between two regulatory systems, 
including harmonization (identical processes and measures), mutual recognition (e.g. the 2004 
EU-US agreement on marine equipment, and the 2012 agreement on organic food), or 
equivalency (e.g. the 1996 EU-US veterinary agreement).
7
 While a regulation may act as a 
TBT, in reality it often reflects genuinely different constituent preferences and strategies, thus 
serving desired public and social objectives, e.g. on health or financial stability, and not all 
such differences can or should be eliminated.
8
  
Trade agreements always suffer the same problem, albeit to varying degree: how to 
convince domestic constituents, stakeholders, and legislators to accept short term pain for 
certain sectors (which vary by agreement) in exchange for long-term gains for the country or 
region as a whole. Political structures, cultural norms, and institutional factors make this 
endeavor very sensitive in several areas, e.g. public procurement, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
audiovisual services, Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS - i.e. food safety and animal 
and plant health) even between close allies. Americans and Europeans vigorously defend their 
own protectionist policies in certain sectors; insist on greater access to the other’s market in 
select sectors, while trying to placate domestic stakeholder and consumer demands. This 
balancing act can be very difficult when attempting complex, multifaceted agreements.  
Europe and the US also tend to seek Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the same countries and regions, and even where there are 
significant similarities in policy objectives and recognized processes, no two treaties signed 
by the EU and the US are identical. The EU and the US have used their size and attractiveness 
to extract greater concessions from, and reforms in, other signatories, resulting in (a) longer 
transition periods with higher retained tariffs on imports to the EU/US during those 
transitions; (b) greater recognition of their own standards, coupled with greater access to the 
other’s markets; (c) exclusion of goods and services the EU/US wanted to protect (e.g. 
domestic shipping and air transport in the US; GMs and audiovisuals in the EU). As a 
percentage of GDP the Canada-EU agreement (CETA), KOREA-EU FTA (KOREU), and 
KOREA –US FTA (KORUS) all provide greater growth as a percentage of GDP  to the 
Canadian and Korean economies, but the regulatory changes required of the two were far 
greater, thus solidifying the influence of the EU and US. TTIP is a negotiation between 
economic equals who share similar norms and values. While that should enable significant 
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progress, the size and ambitious scope of TTIP also give rise to numerous technical and 
political challenges, from differing interpretations of regulations and requirements to 
extensive anti-TTIP interest group campaigns, which in turn have weakened public support.   
This paper discusses three sectors in TTIP: food and agriculture (including SPS), 
motor vehicles, and ISDS. The purpose is to provide some context for the debate, and 
background on the challenges facing the sectors (autos excluded), before discussing potential 
policy paths. It is argued that there is room for compromise on food (especially SPS and 
GMOs) through differentiated labelling and higher tariff rate quotas (TRQs); a few 
modifications in the automobile chapter could result in the first global vehicle, and an ISDS 
with significantly revised parameters is necessary for completion of TTIP. 
 
Agriculture and Food Safety  
While agricultural and food products constitute a relatively small portion (4-5%) of 
transatlantic trade (€23bn annually in2012, with a substantial European trade surplus), tariff 
levels are higher than in other sectors, averaging 9 % in the US (with applied American 
beverage tariffs of 16% and maximum MFN rates of 300%), and 14% in the EU (with applied 
tariffs on dairy imports hovering above 50%, and maximum MFN tariffs of 600%).
9
 
Eliminating applied tariffs on most products face little resistance, but approval nonetheless 
remains dependent on progress in other areas.  
The GATT excludes measures protecting human, plant, or animal health (Art. 20) 
from market liberalization. However, SPS measures are included in most agreements, and 
with regulatory issues at the forefront of TTIP, SPS measures, particularly risk assessment, 
are at or near the top of the list of contentious issues. The US agricultural industry and 
Congress want recognition of American standards as equivalent to those in the EU, and 
expanded market access for poultry, dairy, and beef.
10
 Without the latter a deal is highly 
unlikely; farm groups and Congressional representatives threaten to withhold support absent 
substantial progress on poultry and beef market access.
11
 European dairy, beef, and sugar 
farmers also want greater access to the US market – the impending abolishment of EU milk 
and sugar quotas leave producers needing new markets – while the EU seeks to maintain its 
current policies on pathogen reducing techniques (PRTs), hormones, and GMs. European 
environmental and consumer groups express great resistance to accepting American 
standards, or altering what many Europeans believe are higher (‘safer’) EU standards.12  
The precautionary principle, which states that no action should be taken if the 
consequences are uncertain or possibly dangerous, is often attributed to Europe, and blamed 
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for its resistance to new technologies even though there is little difference between the EU 
and US in the number of areas guided by this principle.
 13
 The European Food Safety Agency 
(EFSA) conducts risk assessments using independent, peer-reviewed scientific studies, as well 
as stakeholder input, while lending greater weight to any uncertainty in the scientific study 
(the input, contingencies) vis-à-vis the resulting probability of risk, than does the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA provides approval in the absence of ‘meaningful 
harm’, preferring to take prohibiting action only when there are scientific findings of harm.14 
The result is a greater likelihood of rejection as a precautionary measure in the EU. This is 
also visible in the political approval process (the Council). Citing inconclusive scientific 
studies on the long-term safety of PRTs such as chlorinated rinse for poultry (the EU allows 
diluted chlorine washes for lettuce), hormone treated beef, and various Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) proposed for the EU market, they are excluded from the Commission‘s 
negotiating mandate.
15
 This does not necessarily make the EU more, as compared to 
differently, risk averse. Europe accepts traditional foods (e.g. raw milk products or fermented 
fish) often deemed unsafe in the US, where new food technologies are more readily accepted. 
The US interprets WTO’s agreement on SPS as allowing practices currently rejected in the 
EU and Korea. Bans on poultry treated in accordance with standards approved by the 
American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are deemed political, and unacceptable to the 
US Congress, which insists that ‘…science-based justification be provided for a sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure if the measure is more restrictive than the applicable international 
standard [and] and appropriately recognize the equivalence of health and safety protection 
systems of exporting countries.’16  
Similarly, in regards to beef from cattle treated with hormones (common in the US) a 
1998 WTO Appellate panel reaffirmed that the EU’s ban was not based on a proper risk 
assessment and not compliant with the WTO SPS agreement, while acknowledging that 
governments can act out of prudence regarding risk to human life, and that risks can be 
ascertained not only in laboratories but also in societies.
17
 Regulators even have the discretion 
to deemphasize the statistical probability of risk in favor of social concerns. As Sunnstein 
(2002) argues ‘[i]f government cannot dissipate fear through information, it might be well 
advised to regulate, at least if regulation will eliminate fear in a relatively inexpensive 
manner.’18 Whether a regulation is ‘expensive’ is a subjective assessment that varies by 
society. However, part of the associated costs necessarily reflects citizens’ willingness to pay 
for increased perceptions of safety. The EU’s failure to alter its regulations as a result of the 
WTO ruling resulted in the US imposing annual duties of 100% on $100m worth of EU 
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agricultural exports. A 2003 EU directive allowing limited use of one hormone failed to 
assuage America’s stance, and though it later (in 2007) lessened duties in return for increased 
hormone–free beef quotas, the EU remains technically non-compliant.19 
Notwithstanding the lack of a uniform definition of protectionism in the WTO the US 
insists that it doesn’t ‘want to force European consumers to eat food they reject; rather, we 
want Europe to follow the advice of its own food safety authority and to give European 
consumers a choice, rather than to persistently ignore science-based decision making for 
political ends.’20 Yet food, and therefore food safety, is an essential part of life; its 
significance to most European far exceeds its nutritional value, and thus caution prevails.
21
 
Processes and products deemed safe by EFSA are often stuck for year awaiting political 
approval. Member States rejected a GM corn (MON810), which, like dozens of other GMOs, 
was deemed safe by EFSA.
22
 Another GMO, Maize 1507, still awaits Commission approval 
after 14 years, despite an ECJ decision criticizing the approval process.
23
 American seed 
companies have also largely abandoned hope of expanded access for GM seeds in the EU, at 
least in the near term.
24
 The 2015 amendments to the 2001 EU GMO Directive allow member 
states to decide which of the approved GMOs to allow domestically, while a country banning 
a particular GMO cannot prohibit imports of products from other EU states allowing the use 
of the same GMO.
25
 While several countries supported an all-out ban, the European 
Parliament was equally insistent o downplaying scientific findings, stating that a decision on 
GMO use should ‘[c]onfer at least as much weight to the opinions of democratically elected 
governments as to the views of the scientific community.’26 The EU’s chief science adviser 
urged more evidence-based decisions, even asserting that GMO opponents suffered from ‘a 
kind of madness,’ only to be forced out following political outcry over her views.27 
Stakeholders (the food industry) also accuse the media of being a ‘driver of controversy with 
terms such as ‘Frankenfood’ fuelling citizen concerns,’ and media headlines to this effect 
were not difficult to find in 2014.
28
 Some have accused certain member states even undermine 
the EFSA by criticizing the agency and/or not voting in support of decisions based on its risk 
assessments, which, in turn, feed into the general lack of trust in the EU, and citizens’ 
skepticism to EFSA.
29
  The prevailing norm of objection to GMOs in the EU (with the partial 
exception of Spain and the Netherlands) is thus deeply entrenched. 
Despite differences, both sides insist they can achieve a ‘constructive’ SPS chapter in 
TTIP.   
 
KOREU, KORUS, CETA 
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The previous agreements solidified more than altered aspects of EU and US food-
related policies. KOREU progressively eliminates tariffs, reaching nearly 98% of all 
agricultural exports by 2031; KORUS removes 97%, but with shorter transition periods.
30
 
KORUS, KOREU, and CETA all exclude the most ‘contentious’ agricultural products from 
tariff elimination or exports (mainly rice, beef, pork, and poultry, in various combinations in 
the three treaties). KOREU allows agricultural safeguard measures, incorporates and reaffirms 
commitments to the WTO Agreement on SPS, denies the use of dispute settlement provisions 
on any issues related to SPS measures, and establishes a committee to work on, among other 
things, enhancing mutual understandings of procedures and to oversee implementation of the 
agreement. KORUS is similar, but adds an emphasis on using risk-based and scientific 
findings to resolve SPS disputes.
31
 CETA goes further. Both sides vow to work on 
establishing equivalencies in each other’s inspection and certification systems, a first for both, 
and a recognition of the greater similarities between the EU and Canada on issues related to 
food. 
 
Policy 
TTIP should go beyond the tariff reduction and recognition model in CETA. While the 
US was disappointed with the EU’s initial offer, the Commission then tabled ‘the most 
extensive tariff reduction ever.’32 TTIP could omit the same sensitive products as were 
excluded from KOREU, CETA, and KORUS, focusing on tariff elimination over 10-20 year 
transition periods in remaining products, while including safeguard measures. This would in 
effect set a global standard by accepting that certain agricultural products can now be 
legitimately exempted based on reasons of ‘serious domestic interests’.33  However, this 
would likely prove unacceptable to Congress. The released text (January 7, 2015) of the EU’s 
proposal for the SPS chapter proposes incorporating and expanding the Veterinary 
Agreement,  abiding by Codex residual levels (where both parties currently fall short on 
certain grains and legumes), and mutually recognizing conformity assessments (Art. 8); there 
are guarantees that US/EU regulations will not be lowered (Art 9.3) as final determination of 
'appropriate level of sanitary protection ' is made solely by the importing country (Art. 7:10). 
In case an emerging regulation hampers trade, EU calls for a ‘technical dialogue’ at the 
request of the exporting country for the purpose of ensuring the importing country chooses the 
most practicable and least trade-restrictive solution.  
Notwithstanding outcry from NGOs likely to interpret the ‘technical dialogue’ as 
ceding to American SPS standards, regulators have shown themselves  able to agree on 
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equivalencies for products and processes, as evidenced during the 2011-2013 High Level 
Working Group’s assessment of potential for a transatlantic agreement.34 As good will 
gestures at the start of TTIP negotiations the EU agreed to accept lactic acid washes in beef 
slaughterhouses and allow imports of American pigs for breeding and processing; the US will, 
on a country-basis, resume imports of EU beef.
35
 Equivalency should be possible on 
individual items, such as oyster testing (the US tests the waters, the EU the oysters; an EU 
assessment confirmed equal levels of protection) or juice (where definitions vary across 
American states).
36
  
Beef hormones are unlikely to be resolved in TTIP negotiations, but European 
preferences for organic beef, and the latter’s rapid growth in the US, could increase the 
potential for American exports if the EU expands the TRQ for hormone (ractopamine)  free 
beef (even if the US/Canada fail to meet the entire current quota), significantly reduces tariffs, 
and guarantees that safeguard measures cannot be applied on items with TRQs.
37
 Emulating 
CETA by separating bison (which must be organic under US law) from beef tariff lines and 
TRQs would signal a political willingness to accommodate US exporters while countering 
seemingly hyperbolic European criticism of American practices.  Differentiated labeling (as 
with products in the EU containing GMOs) should be tabled as an option for beef and poultry, 
replacing market access restrictions and offering consumers a choice. American farmers and 
producers, fearing stigmatization and the high costs of compliance, and European consumer 
groups, fearing mislabeling and cross contamination, will object. However,  expanded market 
access and consumer choice could suffice to overcome these objections if American 
producers are guaranteed transitional tax deductions for increased costs, and the labelling 
agreement is implemented with a decade-long transition period and specific safeguard 
measures (such as suspended imports in case of proven cross-contamination. Full access to 
the US market for European grade-A dairy and beef will also be a necessary part of such an 
agreement, and it needs to be explained (sold) to a skeptical European public with a deftness 
thus far largely absent among supporters of an ambitious TTIP. 
 
Automobiles 
As automotive equals, the EU and the US are partners and competitors. 10 percent of 
bilateral trade is in autos and auto parts, and the EU and US combined account for a third of 
global production and sales; the EU produces more, while the US is the largest market (OICA, 
2013). Elimination of all vehicle tariffs (e.g. small trucks and SUVs face American tariffs of 
25%) is assumed a TTIP minimum; with similar levels of safety (accident statistics per capita 
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are nearly identical), divergent standards on things like headlights, windshields, or side impact 
testing, remain the focus. The automobile sector has seen some of the greatest, often industry–
led, adoption of common standards, and business leaders urge transatlantic partners to ‘…act 
now…making use of first-mover advantage’ to create a transatlantic auto market that 
improves competitiveness and sets global standards.
38
  
Unlike culturally sensitive SPS measures, transatlantic convergence based on data-driven 
safety regulations and product standards for motor vehicles are not of serious concern on 
either side of the Atlantic, with the partial exception of environmental groups’ fears of stalled 
improvements on emissions standards.
39
 American and European labor unions are not, per se, 
opposed to harmonized vehicle standards; they fear an agreement may lead to further 
economic competition and a race-to-the bottom for workers. American unions view TTIP as a 
chance to raise workers’ protection to those embedded in EU legislation (not to mention 
possible wage increases), while European trade unions fear offshoring of manufacturing to the 
less expensive and largely non-unionized American south.
40
  
 
CETA, KORUS, KOREU 
The two Korean agreements provide valuable insight into potential compromises in 
TTIP. There should be no need for the tariff re-imposition safeguard of KORUS, nor the duty-
drawback in KOREU, but including the former could placate labor union fears of potential 
trade distortions.
41
 KOREU and CETA require recognition of the equivalency of United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) standards for auto products in place 
upon entry of the respective treaty; Korea also agreed to bring another 29 domestic safety 
standards in line by mid-2016, the 17 standards recognized by Canada as equivalent to its 
own, a first fora NAFTA member has done this, and it agreed that all future standards must be 
based on UNECE standards, while KORUS includes the mutual harmonization of regulations 
with the US on 42 items related to vehicle standards.
42
 All CETA motor vehicle provisions 
include references to coordination, cumulation, or harmonization with the US upon the entry 
of a prospective EU-US agreement.
43
 Along with the stipulations in KOREU, KORUS, and 
CETA that future harmonization of parts standards be through or compatible with the World 
Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) within the UNECE framework 
should serve all interested stakeholders, as well as multilateral-minded interest groups. Korea 
also agreed in both treaties that remaining differences (not subject to equivalence or 
harmonization) must be applied without creating market access problems, and that all tests 
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carried out in the EU/US, under EU/US standards, are accepted in Korea, an equivalence 
standard ripe for inclusion in TTIP, thereby creating equivalence.
 
 
The real consequential results of the three agreements stems from the combination of 
Rules of Origin requirements (RoOs), TRQs and MFN clauses, and which through TTIP 
could create the first global vehicle.
 
 All three require a minimum of 55 percent of the regional 
value content (RCV, or vehicle value, averaged over a year), even if the calculation methods 
differ slightly.
44
 Importantly, Canadian and American auto parts are interchangeable and 
indistinguishable in mutual trade, and CETA contains a commitment to recognize cumulation 
with the US through TTIP, after which RCV falls to 40%.
45
 CETA also exempts annually for 
7 years 100,000 Canadian automobile exports falling short of the RoO requirement, explicitly 
in anticipation of TTIP and cumulation with the US, a quota far exceeding the country’s 
exports. Such as formula, if doubled, could be usefully applied in TTIP.   
A MFN clause in KOREU allows the application of KORUS emissions standards 
(while Korean levels are based on California standards, KORUS exempts 25,000 vehicles 
annually per manufacturer) since 2013.
46
 Since UNECE standards (applied in CETA) equal 
those in California, the remaining provision needed in TTIP to enable a global vehicle based 
on RoO and emissions standards is an exemption-quota for tariff American free exports to the 
EU until US emission standards improve. Mutual recognition of crash testing standards would 
also significantly reduce costs. Establishing a joint committee to continuously work on further 
harmonization of auto parts not only lower costs but increase jobs, in part by taking market 
shares from suppliers in third countries. While a form of trade diversion, employment 
opportunities in manufacturing should appeal to labor unions. 
 
Policy 
The possible options outlined above are also intended to convey a larger point: that the 
motor vehicle sector, specifically automobiles, could serve as an example of how business 
interest and consumer concerns are compatible. The automotive industry prefers a MRA 
covering all assembled vehicles, achieved through harmonization of all new regulations.
47
 The 
incremental harmonization of standards (or recognition of their equivalence) relying primarily 
on UNECE standards, and conducted in conjunction with Canada through the numerous 
references to inclusion, cumulation and MFN applicable in case of an agreement between the 
EU and US, would accomplish the desired EU outcome, where a ‘[j]oint EU-US approach 
would create a basis for genuine international leadership on motor vehicle regulations through 
reinforcement of the UNECE framework.
48
 The U.S. is unlikely to sign on to the 1998 
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UNECE agreement, but it would be possible for the EU and US to lead other members in a 
new agreement on technical regulations that incorporates aspects or recognizes the 
equivalence of many UNECE standards, while agreeing on new safety and products standards 
going forward.
49
 CETA calls for the EU and Canada to consider harmonizing applicable 
CETA provisions with a future EU-US agreement, while Canada agrees to continue 
recognition of UNECE standards unless they are lower than Canadian or NAFTA standards.
50
 
The inclusion of the latter recognition in TTIP (based on equivalency) should also appeal to 
labor unions and environmental advocates by showing how standards are raised - not lowered 
- through PTAs.
51
 Safeguard measures against import surges, while unlikely to be used given 
comparable production levels, costs, and sales across the Atlantic, would also address 
manufacturers’ and unions’ concerns.52 So, allowing MFN on all UNECE conforming parts or 
their recognized equivalent, regional cumulation on RoO, and agreeing to mutual recognition 
of conformity assessments on test and safety inspections could yield the first global vehicle, 
which would benefit producers and consumers alike.
53
 That should be the public 
communications headline.
 
 
 
Investor State Dispute Settlement 
The furor generated around a half-century old policy, which until 2013 remained an 
obscure feature of international law to all but industry experts, lawyers, and a fraction of 
academia, correlates with the commencement of TTIP negotiations and the conclusion of 
CETA. Investor State Dispute Settlement systems (ISDS), long used in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BiTs), ensure foreign investors have access to non-legislative, de-politicized legal 
redress for compensation when a host country’s government violates the terms of the treaty; it 
ensures ‘…a state will bind itself to comply with international law or with decisions of a 
tribunal that would apply international law principles to define its duties.’54 The purpose of an 
investor-state arbitration system is to thus encourage capital inflows and associated 
investments (e.g. technology) while reducing the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory, legal 
and political action. 
 
In other words risks associated not related to the market place. EU 
Member States have signed 1,400 BiTs with varying forms of investor-state arbitration 
systems; the US 48.
55
  
After adoption of the Lisbon Treaty the Commission declared that the EU’s 
investment policies would include both liberalization and protection, including ISDS.
56
 A 
2012 joint EU-US statement on principles guiding investments also included ISDS.
57
 The 
European parliament acknowledged ISDS can be included in treaties when necessary,
 58
 and it 
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is included in KOREU and CETA. ISDS is part of KORUS, and Congress insists on its 
inclusion in TTIP.
 59
 EU Trade Commissioner Malmström noted when releasing the 
Commission’s response to its ‘consultation’ ISDS in January, 2015 that the Commission will 
not remove ISDS from TTIP, but continue a dialogue with stakeholders and NGOs on refining 
its composition, while waiting until late in negotiations before (formally) reinserting ISDS in 
negotiations.
60
 
Given prior agreements and commitments, ISDS, or a proximate arbitration system is 
likely necessary in order for TTIP to survive. The question is, in what format? 
 
The Debate 
The debate among policy makers, researchers, and stakeholders have come to center 
on a) whether ISDS threatens public policy making, and b) whether domestic court systems 
can adequately and reliably address investor concerns. Advocacy groups and some policy 
makers variably argue that ISDS prevents policy flexibility, while thwarting the principle of 
legitimate decision making by providing companies legal redress against democratic 
government decisions by enabling suits in international tribunals or other agreed criteria for 
arbitration.
61
 References to high-profile suits against governments (e.g. Vattenfall vs. 
Germany) are meant to highlight the threat to governments’ abilities to regulate in the public 
interest. 
90% of existing BiTs have never experienced challenges, a plurality (40%) of ISDS 
cases deal with sectors heavily dominated by state intervention (oil, gas, mining and power), 
and most cases involve developing states with weak and/or politicized judiciaries. Though the 
number of cases globally have risen over the past decade, the rise corresponds to increased 
investment levels, and the percentage of cases filed by an actor correlates with investment 
stock.
62
 EU investors use ISDS more than their American counterparts, and the state prevails 
in most cases, both within the EU and globally.
63
 Pursuing a claim through the dispute 
settlement system is time consuming (cases average several years), very expensive, and 
therefore something companies wish to avoid.
64
 It is also noteworthy that the majority of 
American companies filing suit are not corporate giants, but rather small- and medium-sized 
entities.
65
 
US TTIP negotiators, and the Commission’s negotiating mandate all insist that ISDS 
does not impede governments’ legislative and regulatory independence, while allowing for 
legitimate investor claims when discriminated against based on nationality, denied due 
process, or company assets are expropriated without compensation.
66
 Academic studies and 
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policy papers highlight how treaty language explicitly guarantee states’ rights to regulate to 
protect health, the environment, and other areas in the public interest, and only one case 
where public policy was altered as part of a negotiated settlement, not an arbitration  panel’s 
decision .
67
  
What about using the domestic system?
 
Ikenson argues in a 2014 paper that 
investments are by nature risky; ISDS encourages discretionary investments and socializes 
private risks, while presuming that domestic courts are inadequate to cope with legal 
challenges. However, Kleinheisterkamp (2014), maintains that international investors can use 
domestic courts, and that investment arbitration clauses cannot compensate for, nor override, 
weak local laws (US district courts are not bound by international treaties).  Others argue that 
ISDS is necessary for that very reason; arbitration would be the only resort.
68
 Most domestic 
laws generally treat foreign entities differently than national ones, and states can change 
relevant laws and regulations to fit a political whim or popular demand.
69
 An ISDS provides a 
neutral venue when domestic courts have difficulty separating domestic and international 
obligations; to enforce obligations of the host government when steps taken legally under 
domestic law violate treaty provisions against discrimination, expropriation or obstruction of 
transfer.
70
   
 
KOREU, KORUS, CETA 
KOREUS and CETA include detailed ISDS provisions; KORUS’ provisions preceded 
the US 2012 Model BiT and thus are less defined. Both Korean agreements exclude SPS 
measures from ISDS provisions, while CETA includes ISDS on SPS measures and financial 
services. CETA includes a more transparent ISDS, narrower language, and explicit exceptions 
for where ISDS applies (but still referencing GATT article 20 and GATS art. 24). Either side 
can still adopt prudential measures, while allowing private challenges only against action 
lacking a mutually recognized prudential character.
71
 ‘Mail box’ companies are explicitly 
prevented from filing claims (thus preventing the Philipp Morris case against Australia which 
was filed by a subsidiary out of Hong Kong).
72
 Tribunals may only rule on what is explicitly 
included in the treaty, have enhanced authority to dismiss cases as unwarranted or lacking 
legal merit and can make recommendations to the Trade Committee if a dispute regarding the 
interpretation of any part of the agreement arises at any time during proceedings, the 
Committee on Service and Investments’ interpretation is binding on any Tribunal.73  
 
Policy 
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Advocates of omitting ISDS argue domestic courts suffice, developed countries 
traditionally exclude ISDS in BiTs, or that  a state-to-state dispute settlement system (EU-US) 
with institutionalized consultative bodies tasked with seeking acceptable remedies in disputes 
is preferable;
 74
 these fall short of what  is needed in a credible and effective TTIP. Replacing 
ISDS with a state-to-state (US-EU) system of dispute settlement and explicit and unequivocal 
guarantees of equal treatment to national investors becomes legally challenging given other 
obligations and benefits ascribed to national citizens and corporations.
75
 China latter has for 
years sought to be classified as a market economy by the US and EU, and excluding ISDS 
from developed states’ agreements would set a dangerous precedent if/when China achieves 
its desired status but retains a weak judiciary. Australia included an ISDS in its PTA with 
South Korea, calling it ‘A Modern balanced mechanism with explicit safeguards for 
legitimate pubic welfare regulation,’ omitted the provision in the FTA with Japan, but in the 
recently agreed (November 2014) Australia-China FTA ISDS was deemed necessary to 
‘enable Australians to invest in China with greater confidence’.76 EU and US companies also 
want guaranteed resort to international arbitration should they fall out with Chinese courts.
 77
 
Thousands of BiTs involving EU states, and with weaker state rights, would also 
remain in place if TTIP fails.
78
 Omitting ISDS would thus leave companies greater legal 
recourse against a fellow member state than with the US government. ‘Old’ EU members do 
not wish to give up their own intra-EU BiTs with judicially weaker members; several West 
European companies would not have ventured deep into Eastern Europe and elsewhere if not 
for the protection offered by ISDS.
79
 There are also American doubts about some EU Member 
States’ judiciaries; likewise some American States have shown disregard for international 
agreements (e.g. Texas on consular access).
80
 A majority of EU member states (primarily 
small and midsized, natural-resource-poor members), expressly support ISDS, insisting it can 
both safeguard legitimate European public policy objectives and ensure that European 
investors are adequately protected from American treaty circumvention, such as local 
favoritism, ‘padded contracts,’ and ‘pork-barrel politics’.81 
The Mucula v. Romania case points to the potential conflict between existing BiTs and 
EU laws – specifically whether BiTs signed prior to EU membership can allow policies illegal 
under EU law, and what to do when Commission decisions conflict with sovereign 
obligations – but such problems, and the Vattenfall case, could be avoided with the narrower 
language.
82
 Even prior to the 2015 release of the Commission’s ISDS Public Consultation 
Report it was evident that ISDS provisions would be based on refining the text used in CETA 
and the 2012 US Model BiT (section B); the comments upon the report’s release confirm such 
14 
 
expectations.
83
   CETA’s explicit list of infractions against which a company can file suit, and 
the August 2014 EU Regulation clarifying financial responsibility in all future ISDS disputes 
against EU states or the Union itself,  represents the type of strengthened language and 
enhanced safeguard provisions that should satisfy skeptics while assuring investors.
84
.
85
 
Requiring claimants to first exhaust domestic legal avenues (thus banning simultaneous dual-
track litigation) and thereafter agree to mediation, while requiring losers to pay all litigation 
costs, would further deter claimants by raising the already significant costs of suits, thus 
cutting the number of cases.
86
 Furthermore, specified language on arbitrator ‘code of 
conduct’, ‘right to regulate’, ‘indirect expropriation’, and ‘due process’; allowance for state 
submissions and clarifications during tribunals, requiring ISDS procedures to be transparent 
in all areas short of corporate trade secrets and agreeing an appellate mechanisms for tribunal 
decisions, all add to the clarity of purpose with ISDS while narrowing the legal base for suits.
 
 
Some of these ideas appear, in slightly varied language, in the 2012 US Model BiT, the 2014 
Commission ISDS reform proposals, and the CETA text, thus providing common ground for 
agreement.
 87
  
It is the rather vague language from, and cases under, existing BiTs which appear to 
stoke opposition; the above changes address some key objections by ISDS critics. 
The assumption in TTIP is after all that with 29 democracies ISDS will be very infrequently 
utilized – good governance’ countries are rarely sued, and when they are, they tend to prevail 
– and aforementioned modifications will further lower that probability. 88  But omitting ISDS 
altogether will weaken the stated goal of TTIP as precedent setting through higher standards, 
undermine attempts at its inclusion in future agreements (with China), counter a majority of 
member states’ and business organizations’ preferences, and significantly lessen the 
likelihood that Congress approves TTIP.
89
  
Conclusion 
TTIP’s ambitious agenda of regulatory recognition and/or convergence, of setting 
precedents for future agreements, is testing the limits of accommodation and compromise on 
both sides of the Atlantic. There are policy options for compromises to satisfy the majority of 
interest involved, but it will require convincing key constituencies of the necessity for 
change,; arguably easier on automobiles, and possibly ISDS, than on food issues. Yet with 
potential agreements mimicking or expanding on existing language in KORUS, KOREU and 
CETA, US and EU officials, as well as business, should highlight the congruencies with these 
agreements, where sealing TTIP can create the embryo of a global, western values-based 
market place with 900 million consumers on three continents.  
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